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National governments often choose to delegate tasks and burdens to lower levels in a 
comprehensive system of administration. Local and regional governance thereby 
becomes an important factor in policy implementation. This paper focuses on the 
incentive problem that follows from such a delegation of competences to collect taxes 
and do lending at the local level in a multi-level geo-administrative system. The paper 
uses the Danish administrative system to illustrate the actual outcomes from such 
incentive problems. A two-step estimation procedure will be used to derive results on 
the importance of incentive problems in multi-level geo-administrative systems. 
Setting up elaborate administrative systems will introduce agency problems that lead 
to inefficiencies in both local and national governance. 
 
1. Introduction 
National states are often characterized by delegation in terms of the tasks and burdens 
of public provision of goods and services. This may be observed in unitary states, 
such as the Danish, where the state delegates the task of offering local public services 
and the burdens of financing these to lower levels of the geo-administrative system, 
e.g. municipalities and counties. It may also be observed in federal states like 
Germany, where federal government shares competences with states within the 
federation, which again delegates tasks and burdens to lower levels of administration.   2
Complex systems of public administration seem embodied in the public sector of most 
countries. The motivation behind such aspirations to decentralize in real life may be 
many. Two theoretical arguments have been stated in the literature. One builds on a 
Tiebout economy. Following Tiebout (1956), individuals will respond to the 
decentralization of tasks and burdens related to the public provision of local public 
goods and services by voting with their feet. Mobile consumers will move towards the 
areas offering the task-burden package fitting best to their preferences. Given there 
are a large number of communities, i.e. variation in the task-burden relationship, the 
mobility of individuals may replace the invisible hand of private markets. Mobility 
has in the Tiebout economy solved for the problems of public goods stated by 
Samuelson (1954), i.e. external effects of consuming public goods. The purity of the 
Tiebout economy in solving such problems has though been disputed in e.g. Bewley 
(1981), arguing that the Tiebout economy implies assumptions that essentially 
transform the local public good into a private good. 
 
The other theoretical motivation is the decentralization theorem of Oates; see e.g. 
Oates (1999). Decentralizing the task of providing public goods and services renders 
at least as high welfare as centralized provision, given there are not cost savings from 
centralization and no externalities in the provision of local authorities. This argument 
does not build on strong assumptions of mobile individuals but states precise 
conditions under which decentralization does at least as well as centralized provision. 
 
These theoretical arguments are closely related to the presence of tax competition in 
decentralized systems. Tax competition will curtail Leviathan states, which adds to 
the efficiency of the administrative system, as argued in Rauscher (1997). Local 
authorities compete to do the job more effectively by trimming their organization and 
thereby collect fewer taxes. Tax competition has though been argued to imply 
problems in terms of providing the socially optimal level of public goods and 
services. Competition may make financing public goods and services that correct for 
market imperfections impossible and will thereby reduce welfare. A counterargument 
can be found in Schmidt (1999), arguing that divisible tax objects in the presence of 
local risks will not only respond to spatial differences in tax levels in optimising the 
mean-variance trade off in the return. 
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These kinds of arguments must be seen as essential to any analysis of the geo-
administrative structure of any government. Still, the implementation of decentralized 
government in most states takes a number of more complex structures, which are 
important in respect to the benefits and drawbacks of decentralizing tasks and 
burdens. Here, the issue of decentralized the burdens in public provision will be in 
focus. The gains from decentralized provision may seem straightforward in the 
absence of spatial externalities and economies to scale in provision, but local 
financing of local public provision of goods and services will add new important 
aspects to be included in the overall balance. Evidence from the Danish multi-level 
geo-administrative system points to extensive incentive distortions embodied in the 
financing schemes. 
 
The paper has five sections. The following section offers a short review on some of 
the arguments from the literature on incentive problems from financing schemes in 
multi-level governance. Section 3 takes a closer look at the Danish system and offers 
an example of how intergovernmental financing systems may take very complex 
forms and leave the agents
1 in a principal-agent relationship with distorted incentives. 
Section 4 presents the empirical evidence on the presence of such distortions in 
Denmark using a two-step estimation procedure based on non-parametric estimation 
method and panel estimation methods. The last section summarizes. 
 
2. Multi-level governance – strategic interaction and incentive distortions 
Most geo-administrative systems are in some way structured in several levels with 
each their specific spatial jurisdiction with respect to specific tasks and burdens. The 
basic question is, what kind of incentive problems may result from such 
decentralization and delegation in a multi-level geo-administrative system? A useful 
point of departure in laying out incentive problems is a principle of decentralization. 
The economic responsibility, i.e. the burden, should be decentralized to the level 
determining the extent of local public provision, i.e. the task. This should prevent free 
rider problems that may occur if individuals in some jurisdiction contribute to the 
financing of service levels in other jurisdictions. If such co-financing were to occur, 
this would imply serious incentive problems. Imposing this principle will eliminate 
                                                 
1 Using the principal-agent literature on the subject, the agent would be the lower levels in the geo-
administrative system, while the principal would be the central government.   4
some of the strategic issues in multi-level governance, but it may introduce others. 
Decentralized burdens will introduce the issue of tax competition. What remains is 
how to deal with tax competition. One approach is through a proper tax assignment. 
Another approach is to design an intergovernmental transfer scheme. A system of 
transfers between local governments and between central government and local 
government may be designed such as to counter distortions occurring from the 
decentralization of tax collection. In sense, the question is how to patch up incentive 
problems associated with tax competition in a geo-administrative system? 
 
It is well known from the literature on optimal taxes, that the best tax objects are 
objects that are in inelastic supplied in the local economy. The ideal tax objects are 
accordingly rather immobile assets like property. This does not seem to be a viable 
route to solve the problems of strategic interaction in a multi-level system of 
governance, as on rather consistently observes comparably high rates of e.g. income 
taxes as compared to taxes on property in most developed countries. The overall 
financing of geo-administrative systems may be designed such as to tax sources that 
are in inelastic supply from the point of view of the central government, while in 
elastic supply at the local level. This argument would indicate a need for reforms, 
especially in a globalized economy that questions the first premise of the argument. 
 
The problems associated with tax competition may also be mitigated through a set of 
intergovernmental transfers. Can transfers between local administrative levels or 
transfers between central government and local government be designed to counter 
such problems? The answer is affirmative. Intergovernmental transfers can be used to 
counter the distortions from decentralization of non-benefit taxes, i.e. taxes on 
externalities from strategic behaviour, see Gordon (1983). These transfers are 
basically to be understood as Pigouvian taxes inducing the local policy-makers to 
internalise the spill-over on other jurisdictions. Transfers are as such corrective taxes. 
Intergovernmental transfers are conditional and the central government finances a 
share of the expenditure of lower levels of government. 
 
Intergovernmental transfers may have other objectives than countering distortions 
from strategic interaction. They may reflect an attempt to obtain fiscal equalization. 
This may also reflect mobility. As mobile households segregate into areas inhabited   5
by households of similar taste and preferences, a concentration of wealthy households 
in some jurisdictions and a concentration of poor households in others may occur
2. In 
this type of equilibrium, the central government may want to redistribute resources 
from wealthy to poor jurisdictions on grounds of equity, i.e. there would be a fiscal 
gap between jurisdictions. 
 
The arguments pursued until now implicitly assumes, that central government 
decentralizes tasks and successively acts as an arbitrator to prevent distortions. In a 
more elaborate set-up, where (public) goods are provided by local authorities and 
national authorities simultaneously and financed from taxing the same tax base, the 
analysis is more diverse. This diversity occurs due to a number of other reasons for 
the presence of a fiscal gap. The trade-offs between the gains from decentralizing the 
provision goods, i.e. the decentralization theorem, and the problems of e.g. tax 
competition from decentralizing tax collection also points to the existence of a fiscal 
gap. Collecting taxes should be pursued at higher levels in the geo-administrative 
system, whereas the provision of (public goods) should be pursued at the lower 
levels
3. These situations are analysed in a number of articles, e.g. Boadway and Keen 
(1996) and Boadway and Flatters (1982). The basic problem in these models is that 
several levels in the public administration have the same tax base. 
 
Boadway and Keen (1996) includes a number of mechanisms that are central to a 
discussion of centralization versus decentralization. The starting point is a common 
tax base (labour) for different levels in the geo-administrative system. Tax objects are 
twofold. Units of labour are both taxed by the local and national governments 
distorting labour supply. A 100 percent tax is furthermore levied on rents (profits) and 
is shared by the local and national governments according to some fixed exogenous 
factor. This leads to a potential vertical
4 externality, as increasing tax rates at one 
                                                 
2One outcome would be that the wealthy jurisdictions have a higher provision (and quality) of the local 
(public) good, which will be the case if it is a normal good. Free mobility may make such an 
equilibrium unstable, although this need not be the case, see Besley and Coate (1991). 
3At present, the potential problems that such a strategy may be conducive to the problems of economic 
responsibility are ignored. 
4In addition to the usual horizontal externalities that occur due to tax competition.   6
level of the geo-administrative system may have adverse effects on the tax revenue of 
other levels. The negative effects of local tax increases on the federal tax revenue is 
not internalised by local governments, why federal tax rates may turn out to be 
negative to counter this externalities. This may imply both a negative federal tax rate 
and a negative fiscal gap. 
 
The externality occurs due to distortions to the labour supply. Local taxes distort local 
labour supply, which reduces the tax revenue of the federal government. Another 
effect originates from the taxation of rents. Increases in local government taxes will 
distort the labour supply, which results in a reduction in rents. A share of these rents 
enters the tax revenue of the federal government, why federal tax revenues are 
reduced
5. A lack of ability or unwillingness to internalise these effects in the optimal 
policies within the geo-administrative system leads to a lower marginal cost of public 
funding for the local authorities relative to a first-best unitary policy. This will tend to 
increase the activity in terms of taxes at lower administrative levels. 
 
What is the optimal policy for the central government given these externalities? The 
central government can basically consider two kinds of options. It can either collect 
revenue from taxes on labour. Incentives with respect to the common tax base at 
lower levels of the administrative system must then be internalised. It can 
alternatively let the local authorities collect taxes, and finance the central public good 
though intergovernmental transfers  - in sense, the central government lets the lower 
levels do the unpleasant job of collecting taxes
6. The more obvious policy implication 
of the analysis is a transfer of funds towards the jurisdiction - or in this case the level 
of government in the geo-administrative system - with the highest marginal cost of 
public funding. Due to the distortionary effects of taxes and the lack of internalisation 
of these at the different administrative levels, there may be significant differences in 
the marginal cost of public funding at the different levels of the system. 
 
                                                 
5Note, that the local government only internalises the adverse effects on local tax revenues from 
reduced tax revenues from profits - which is a fixed share of the profits. 
6The arguments presented here are though not motivated by such political considerations, but are based 
on pure efficiency arguments. In a political economy set-up, one may conjecture, that certain types of 
equilibria in Boadway and Keen (1996) are unstable.   7
Although temptingly simple, this will not in general hold. Intergovernmental transfer 
influence the taxes rates set by local governments and thereby the extent of the 
vertical externality. As the central government adjusts its transfer-policy, the states 
will simultaneously adjust their tax policy. The vertical externality changes - local 
authorities internalise the transfers they receive or have to pass on to the national 
government, though without internalising the effect of changes in the local tax rate on 
the central governments tax revenue. This will change the relative differences in 
marginal costs of public funding at the different administrative levels and thereby the 
extent of the optimal transfer. These two effects may point in two directions with 
respect to the optimal transfer chosen by the central government. The size and 
magnitude of the fiscal gap will therefore be ambiguous. 
 
There is no easy way out of efficiency problems from tax competition. As the 
mechanisms in Boadway and Keen (1996) should indicate, intergovernmental 
transfers need neither be such a solution. Setting up geo-administrative systems may 
in general imply several pitfalls that have to be taken into account. Changes in the role 
of the central government may accordingly trigger off such mechanisms that may not 
improve on efficiency, why there is a warrant for carefulness. It would therefore be 
important to obtain some empirical evidence on the functioning of geo-administrative 
systems with intergovernmental transfers. 
 
It should finally be noted, that this short review on the rich literature on fiscal 
federalism is by no means exhausting. There may be other mechanisms of importance, 
see e.g. Nechyba (1996) for an analysis in a CGE set-up. It should have indicated 
some of the problems present when designing intergovernmental transfers in a geo-
administrative system. Before turning to the empirical evidence on the extent of 
distortions in the Danish geo-administrative system, a short review on the 
practicalities in respect to decentralized financing in Denmark will be offered, so as to 
facilitate a better understanding between the theoretical arguments and the actual 
observable distortions in the Danish geo-administrative system. 
 
3. Decentralizing financing in Denmark 
Denmark has a longstanding tradition of decentralization within the context of a 
unitary state. This makes it an interesting case, as it embodies both the desire of a 
central government to have a strong influence on overall policy development at the   8
national level and in the regions, while decentralizing both tasks and burdens. It 
should therefore embody the kinds of problems inherent in a decentralized system 
with modest geographies and within geographies with an overall homogenous 
population
7. The financing of the public sector in Denmark does to a large extent 
depend on income taxes. In 1997 the share of revenues from income taxes was 46 
percent, while VAT as the second most important source had a share of only 17 
percent
8. For municipalities, the most important source of financing was in 1997 again 
income taxes with a total share of 78 percent of total revenues. The second most 
important source of revenues for municipalities was transfers, which represented 15 
percent of total revenues
9. Income taxes are accordingly important to all levels in the 
geo-administrative system in Denmark and increasingly so as one moves downwards 
in the administrative system. As such, the Danish geo-administrative system should 
be subject to the incentive problems laid out in the previous section on multi-level 
government, as several levels depend on the same tax base. 
Decentralized tasks and burdens has been a long withstanding characteristic of the 
Danish federal system. Since a major reform of the geo-administrative system in 
1970
10, tasks have gradually been decentralized and burdens have to a large extent 
followed. Municipalities and counties should ideally finance their own activities by 
levying taxes. At a first glance, the implied decentralization of fiscal policies does 
seem impressing. Not only were municipalities and counties given autonomy with 
respect to a wide range of tasks to be pursued by the public sector, they were also 
given autonomy to finance these activities by fixing income taxes. This indicates a 
considerable decentralization of fiscal policies and public regulation. This has lead to 
a comparably large autonomy and spread in tax rates across Danish municipalities and 
counties. 
 
                                                 
7 The diversity in language, culture and identity is considered rather modest. 
8The data required to do these calculations can be found in “Statistiske Efterretninger: 
Nationalregnskab, offentlige finanser og betalingsbalancen 1998:23" published by Statistics Denmark. 
9The source for the later calculations is “Statistiske Efterretninger: Nationalregnskab, offentlige finanser 
og betalingsbalance: 1998:11" published by Statistics Denmark. 
10 The reform initiated in 1970 (Kommunalreformen) lead to a drastic reduction in the number of 
municipalities and counties. This was seen as facilitating an increased ability to pursue tasks in public 
provision and the accompanying burdens at the lower levels of the geo-administrative system.   9
Income taxes set by municipalities range from 15.5 percent to 22.8 percent in the year 
2000, a difference of 7.3 percentage-points. The corresponding difference for the sum 
of county and municipality income tax percentages is 8.3 percentage-points ranging 
from 26.5 percent to 34.8 percent. The difference therefore becomes wider as the 
income taxes levied by counties are included. Although tax rates vary, it should be 
stressed that the central government attempts to counter large tax increases at the 
lower levels of the geo-administrative system. An annual agreement between central 
government, LGDK and Danish Regions
11 imposes an upper bound on the increases 
of the average tax rate across all municipalities and counties. Tax rates may 
accordingly develop differently across municipalities and counties but with the 
restriction of an aggregate bound on the average tax increase. Tax rates do not give 
the full picture with respect to decentralized financing in Denmark. A set of 
compensation schemes is also of crucial importance. 
 
In terms of compensation schemes, the Danish system embodies both a set of 
vertical
12 and a set of horizontal
13 compensation schemes
14. The vertical 
compensation schemes reflect the desire to decentralize tasks by the central 
government. The transfers are as a starting point determined according to the 
municipalities or counties share of the total tax base of the previous year. This sum is 
adjusted through three principles – the extended principle of aggregate balance
15, a 
budget warranty scheme
16 and an adjustment according to the changes in prices and 
wages. The first principle of adjustment compensates the lower levels of the geo-
administrative system for tasks that have been decentralized during the year. The 
second principle of adjustment concerns the risk associated with the in tax bases. 
Counties and municipalities can choose either to apply budget procedures that are 
based on a tax base guaranteed by the central government or it can choose to apply 
budget procedures based on a decentralized tax base estimate
17. Vertical transfers are 
                                                 
11 LGDK represents the Danish municipalities and Danish Regions represents the Danish counties. 
12 Bloktilskud 
13 Mellemkommunale udligningsordning 
14 For an elaborate exposition in Danish on the different schemes see e.g. Indenrigsministeriet (2001a), 
Indenrigsministeriet (2001b), Indenrigs- og sundhedsministeriet (2003a) and Indenrigs- og 
sundhedsministeriet (2003b). 
15 DUT – Det Udvidede Totalbalanceprincip. 
16 Budgetgarantiordningen. 
17 In the first case, the Ministry of the Interior forecasts the tax base of each county or municipality 
using the tax base of the previous years and a common discount rate. If the actual tax base was to   10
furthermore adjusted to accommodate general price and wage increases in the society. 
Apart from these three types of adjustments, municipalities with a very moderate tax 
base will receive a minor additional adjustment and there exists some reimbursements 
on specific expenditures delegated to the lower levels of the geo-administrative 
system. These vertical transfers are in general neutral in terms of the redistribution of 
funds in between municipalities. 
 
The horizontal transfers are on the other hand leads to a high degree of redistribution. 
This scheme is to ensure sufficient revenues to counties and municipalities with a 
weak tax base as compared with the expenditure requirements. The horizontal transfer 
scheme attempts to alleviate such inequalities in the revenue-expenditure relationship. 
It consists of two types of transfers. One transfer relates to the differences in needs. It 
removes revenues from municipalities with moderate needs measured by some 
objective criteria and transfers funds to municipalities with needs above the average. 
The transfer is determined by computing the average cost structure across all 
municipalities corrected with 1) a 7.5 mill. DKK fixed expense
18; 2) the age structure 
in the municipality relative to the national average and 3) the social structure in the 
municipality relative to the national average. These corrected expenses are compared 
to the average expenses across all municipalities, and the transfer is 45 percent of the 
difference and an additional transfer of 40 percent of the difference within the 
metropolitan area. The transfer is therefore independent of the actual expenses of a 
given municipality, but takes its starting point in the average expenses across all 
municipalities and corrects with respect to a number of measures that in the short-
term lies beyond the influence of the individual municipality, e.g. the share of 7-16 
years old. This emphasis on objective criteria must be interpreted as an attempt to 
prevent distortionary effects of the transfer. 
 
Redistribution in-between municipalities furthermore include horizontal transfers 
motivated by differences in the tax base. The tax base of Danish municipalities 
consists of the income generated by residents and the taxation of some kinds of 
property. Differences in the average tax base across all municipalities and the tax base 
of a given municipality is reduced through a transfer of 40 percent of the difference. 
                                                                                                                                            
deviate from the guaranteed, the counties or municipalities will either make payments to or receive 
payments from the central government. 
18 This base allowance should benefit the small municipalities.   11
Municipalities with very low tax bases - below 90 percent of the average tax base - 
are given a transfer of 45 percent of the difference, such that there is progression in 
the transfer scheme. The municipalities in the metropolitan area are subject to 
additional redistribution. Any variation in the tax base of the 50 municipalities in the 
metropolitan area is reduced by an additional transfer of 40 percent of the differences 
within the metropolitan area. There is accordingly an extensive horizontal 
redistribution motivated by differences in the tax base. These transfers may be 
expected to result in considerable distortions. To counter some of these distortions, 
there is an additional rule ensuring an increase in the post-transfer tax base of at least 
10 pct. of the increase in the pre-transfer tax base for a given municipality. 
 
The Danish multi-level geo-administrative system consists of a number of delegations 
and compensation schemes that lead to a number of incentive problems. One is the 
very pure effect of decentralizing the collection of taxes. This in itself leads to a 
number of incentive problems as described in section 2. The vertical transfers should 
add to these distortions in the form of externalities, as described in e.g. the 
contributions of Boadway and Keen (1996). Several levels in the geo-administrative 
system have joint tax bases, as central government, counties and municipalities all 
collect taxes from labour income. The vertical transfers of the Danish geo-
administrative system does to a lesser extent reflect the desire to prevent such 
distortions but reflects the desire to adjust for the fiscal gap occurring from an 
extensive delegation of tasks to lower levels that is not matched by a complete 
autonomy to set tax rates. The horizontal transfer scheme should also lead to incentive 
problems. The transfer scheme has characteristics that are similar to a progressive 
income tax scheme on personal income and should embody some of the same 
distortions to behaviour. Having focussed on the details of the financing of the Danish 
geo-administrative system, what remains is to present evidence on the distortions 





                                                 
19 It may be mentioned, that the system in terms financing also incorporates some restrictions on the 
lending of the lower levels of the geo-administrative system. There are also restrictions on sell-and-
lease-back constructions.  These details will though be of secondary importance to the strategic 
interaction in the geo-administrative system.   12
4. Does Decentralization and Transfers Schemes Produce Incentive Distortions? 
Is there any evidence of incentive distortions in the Danish geo-administrative 
system? The present section provides evidence of such incentive distortions through 
an empirical analysis of the outcomes of the intergovernmental transfer scheme in 
Denmark. It will initially be necessary to recognize, that the functional relationships 
reflecting incentive distortions may take many forms. In this sense, it will be 
necessary to use flexible empirical methods in the analysis, see e.g. Horowitz (1998) 
for an excellent exposition on non-parametric and semi-parametric estimation 
methods. These methods have the advantage of not superimposing strong assumptions 
on the functional relationship, while on the other hand facing the problem of a 
graphical presentation of the results, which reduces the dimensionality of the analysis. 
 
The previous section laid out the richness of the inter-governmental transfers present 
in the Danish geo-administrative system. From the theoretical discussions, one may 
expect such transfers to lead to incentive problems.  These problems should be 
reflected in the relationship between pre-transfer and post-transfer tax bases at the 
lower levels of the geo-administrative system. Figure 1 presents a cross plot between 
the per capita income tax base before transfers and after transfers. The data in figure 1 
is the cross plot for 2002. 
 
















Source: The Danish Ministry of the Interior, Kommunale Nøgletal 2003  
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An inspection of figure 1 indicates the problems present in extensive redistribution 
schemes in geo-administrative systems. Problems parallel those occurring from 
taxation in labour markets may also be relevant in multi-level governance situations. 
Most types of tax schemes do lead to incentive problems, as they make agents in 
principle-agent relationships “misbehave” in some manner. Progressive taxation on 
labour income may e.g. lead to incentive problems due to the reduced return from 
increased efforts. Some of these arguments may also be relevant for the implicit 
taxation of municipalities in a multi-level geo-administrative system. The Danish 
system of intergovernmental transfers reflects some of the problems parallel to the 
incentive problems in labour markets. Figure 1 illustrates, that for the municipalities 
with the very lowest per capita tax bases before transfers, increasing the before 
transfer tax base does lead to quite considerable increases in the after transfer tax 
base. For this group of municipalities, there would seem to be few incentive problems 
in terms of incentives to promote growth in the per capita tax base. At and around 
125.000-130.000 DKK, this relationship between the before and after transfer tax base 
seems to come to a halt. For a group of mid-range municipalities, not only does the 
redistribution scheme of inter-governmental transfers reduce the tax base after 
transfers relative to the tax base before transfers, but any attempt to increase the tax 
base before transfers leads to virtually no increases in the tax base after transfers. This 
should lead to incentive problem within the transfer scheme. For municipalities with a 
high tax bases before transfers, there is also a considerable reduction to the tax base 
after transfers, but there are indications that increasing the tax base before transfers 
does render some of the gains to the high-end municipalities. 
 
Taking figure 1 at face value, the geo-administrative systems in Denmark with its 
extensive redistribution between municipalities may be expected to result in important 
incentive problems. It should though be noted, that figure 1 only is a cross-plot for the 
year 2002. The extent to which such incentive problems are stable across time would 
also be of interest. To facilitate an analysis of the changes in structure of the incentive 
problems, the non-parametric estimation of non-linear structures as displayed in 
figure 1 can be used, see Horowitz (1998) or Horowitz and Lee (2002) for a 
methodological introduction. Using these methods, one can extract a functional 
relationship, which can be illustrated graphically. Using the Nadaraya-Watson method   14
to perform the nonparametric estimations
20, the following relationship between the 
per capita tax base before and after transfers is found for the years 1996 and 2002. 
 
















Source: The Danish Ministry of the Interior, Kommunale Nøgletal 2003  
 
Using these estimates on the relationship between the per capita tax base of Danish 
municipalities before and after transfers, it seems clear that the relationship changes 
over time. One aspect is the more compressed curve in 1996 relative to 2002. The 
variance in the per capita tax base before transfers has increased, leading to a 
corresponding increase in the per capita tax base after transfers. The second aspect 
concerns the slope of the curves. As the estimation methods is sensitive to the choice 
of bandwidth, one should be careful not to interpret the changes in the slope to 
harshly. Still, there is a tendency for the 1996 curve to be positively sloping over 
larger parts of the support than the 2002 curve. The 2002 curve has relatively long 
stretches with a moderate slope as compare to the 1996 curve. This will be interpreted 
as reflecting changes in the incentives present in the transfer schemes between the 
different municipalities. 
                                                 
20 As specified in Koning (1996) based in Silvermann (1986) and Härdle (1990). The kernel used under 
the estimation procedures was the Gaussian kernel and the bandwidth to define the smoothness for the 
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where h is the bandwidth, s is the sample standard deviation, IQR is the inter-quartile range of the data 
points and n is the sample size. The results in figure 2 are based on a bandwidth twice h to get 
sufficiently smooth functions. Alternatively the estimation procedure attempts to capture more details 
in the data, resulting in a very non-smooth function.   15
 
Figure 2 indicates the importance of considering the distortions originating from the 
intergovernmental transfer scheme. The changing functional forms in figure 2 results 
from one of two factors. It may reflect changes in the objective criteria defining 
eligibility for a given municipality. It may also reflect changes in the incentive 
structure present in the transfer scheme. The first factor would be in accordance with 
the policy aims and do not represent incentive distortions, while the later factor does 
reflect incentive distortions. To get a more accurate impression of the importance of 
these factors, it will be necessary to turn to multivariate analysis. Considering the 
structure of the data including both a cross section and a time series dimension, the 
panel estimation methods will be used to allow for any possible unobserved 
heterogeneity among the municipalities. The present analysis will only consider the 
time period from 1996 and onwards, as the Danish intergovernmental transfer scheme 
in between municipalities was changed significantly from 1995 to 1996. Any 
comparison of figures before and after 1996 calls for caution. 
 
Using multivariate analysis allows for several covariates. These variables may be 
chosen using different approaches. One approach would be to include actual expense 
variables on a number of specific variables measuring the socio-economic structure in 
the different municipalities. This would leave the analysis very close to the actual 
calculations of the intergovernmental transfers. It would furthermore internalize 
productivity differences in the cost structure across Danish municipalities. Given the 
subject of analysis is the distortion from intergovernmental transfers, which may 
result in these productivity differentials, such an approach does not seem appropriate 
in an explicit analysis of distortions in the transfer scheme.  
 
An alternative approach will be used here. This approach includes structural measures 
on a number of policy areas, where the Danish municipalities have important 
decentralized tasks to pursue. These tasks can be laid out into the following seven 
areas: 1) labour markets, 2) housing, 3) schooling, 4) child care, 5) care for the 
elderly, 6) integration of immigrants (refugees) and 7) social assistance. For each of 
these seven areas, the analysis will use one or more covariates to determine whether 
the variation in these variables explain the observable variation in the outcome of the 
intergovernmental transfer scheme.   16
 
The issue of an appropriate estimation strategy is furthermore of importance. Given 
the diverse functional relationship between the per capita tax base before and after 
transfers, it would be tempting to use non-linear estimation methods to capture such a 
relationship
21. In the present context, the aim is though to focus on the distortions 
originate from the transfer scheme. Such distortions would not be identifiable using 
traditional non-linear methods. The present analysis accordingly uses a two-step 
approach. The first step identifies the distortions in terms of non-linearity and 
constructs a measure for this non-linearity. Two measures will be offered in the first 
step. One measure is defined as the slope of the curves in figure 2 evaluated at each 
observed per capita tax base before transfers (SLOPEINC). This slope would indicate 
what is to be gained for the municipality from a marginal increase in the per capita tax 
base before transfers. The other measure takes its point of departure in the OLS 
regression between the per capita tax base before and after transfers. The observed 
deviation from the OLS-line is interpreted as a measure of the distortions implicit in 
the transfer scheme (DIFFINC). The OLS-line is interpreted as the policy aim in 
terms of redistribution. A 45-degree line could have been used instead, although this 
would have implied the absence of redistribution in the policy aims of the transfer 
scheme. The OLS-line is interpreted as the politically accepted trade off between 
redistribution and distortions
22. Any deviation from the “OLS-policy” must originate 
from non-intended distortions in the system. Each of the two measures – SLOPEINC 
and DIFFINC - is calculated for a given municipality in a given year. The second 
measure (DIFFINC) is based on the OLS-line for a given year. 
 
The second step performs the panel estimation and includes a number of structural 
measures for the seven types of tasks pursued by Danish municipalities and the two 
measures for the distortion (SLOPEINC/DIFFINC) as covariates. Data is available for 
the period 1996-2002 for 275 Danish municipalities. The data was collected from the 
database Indenrigsministeriet (2003c) that contains a number of indicators on the 
activities and structure of the Danish municipalities. Table A1 in the appendix 
summarizes the measures used in the panel regressions. 
                                                 
21 E.g. ML-estimation of a non-linear functional form. 
22 The OLS-line may be interpreted as the minimum distortion redistribution scheme, as linear schemes 
will in most cases distort the least amongst the set of redistribution schemes.   17
 
The analysis will use panel estimation methods that controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity not captured by the covariates. One of the troublesome issues when 
using panel data estimation methods concerns the proper specification of the 
unobservable individual heterogeneity. What is the structure of the unobservable 
heterogeneity and how should it be specified so that it is uncorrelated with the 
observable covariates
23? Unobserved heterogeneity can be modeled through a number 
of alternative specifications. The two most commonly used are the fixed effects 
models and the random effects models. The first model assumes that the unobservable 
heterogeneity can be captured by a non-stochastic term specific to the individual, 
while the other assumes that it can be captured by a stochastic term with iid 
properties. There are obviously a number of extensions to these models, see e.g. 
chapter 14 and 15 in Greene (2000) or Baltagi (1995). The modeling approach used to 
obtain the present results, initially compares the fixed effects with the random effects 
specification. It then compares the best of these models with the results from a model 
allowing a more general specification of the stochastic nature of the unobservable 
heterogeneity.  
 
The analysis is conditional on the observations of 275 Danish municipalities. The 
endogenous variable in the estimations will be the per capita tax base after transfers in 
a given municipality, as this indicates the outcome of the transfer scheme. The model 
may therefore be specified as: 
 
it i it it it it v D S TBBT TBAT + + + + + = µ β β α 2 1        (1) 
 
Where TBATit is the per capita tax base after transfers of the i
th municipality at time t, 
α is the intercept, TBBTit is the per capita tax base before transfers, Sit is a matrix of 
structural indicators within the seven groups of tasks performed by Danish 
municipalities, Dit is one of the two distortion measures SLOPEINC or DIFFINC, µi 
is the individual unobservable effect for each municipality and vit is the remainder 
error term.  This equation attempts to explain how the per capita tax base after 
                                                 
23 If the unobservable heterogeneity turns out to be correlated with the observable covariates in the 
model, this results in a misspecification that would reduce the significance of the parameter estimates 
for the observable covariates.   18
transfers is determined and if the distortions measured by the non-linearity in the 
relation between the pre and after transfer tax base has any explanatory power, i.e. 
does the non-linearity of the system matter for the outcome of the transfer scheme, 
when controlling for the structure of the municipality. The equation therefore extends 
the analysis in figure 1 and 2. 
 
A fixed effects specification assumes that µi is a fixed constant for each municipality, 
while the random effects specification is obtained by assuming that µi is stochastic 
with iid properties
24. The estimation results for the random effects specification will 
not be shown
25, but comparing the two models using a Breusch-Pagan test rejects the 
absence of individual effects and a Hausman test rejects that the random effects term 
and the observable covariates in the random effects specification are orthogonal. The 
later supports the fixed effects specification, as the random effects specification 
assumes orthogonal covariates relative to the random effects term. The Breusch-
Pagan test rejects a simple OLS specification. This overall lends itself to the fixed 
effects specification. 
 
A more general specification of the unobservable individual effects may furthermore 
be proposed, such that the unobservable heterogeneity is captured in the covariance 
matrix of the error terms rather than by an additive term in the model specification. 
The estimated model has the following specification: 
 
it it it it it v D S TBBT TBAT + + + + = 2 1 β β α        (2) 
The error term vit will represent a generalization in two respects. One concerns the 
autoregressive structure of the error terms, which allows for a more general 
specification in the time dimension of the data, i.e. a first-order panel specific 
autoregressive error terms specification with a dynamic error term structure of 
it it i it v v ε ρ + = −1 . This introduces a dynamic structure into the model, where error 
terms depend on previous realizations. It furthermore introduces heterogeneity 
through the autoregressive parameter that is specific to the municipality. The other 
                                                 
24 I.e. E(µi )=0, E(µi
2)=σµ
2, E(vitµi)=0 and E(µiµj)=0. The structure of vit is for both specifications 
E(vit)=0, E(vit
2)=0 and E(vit vjs)=0. 
25 For reference, the result from the estimation of the fixed effect model can be found in appendix A2 
together with the Breusch-Pagan and Hausman test statistics.   19
extension concerns heterogeneity in the cross-sectional dimension. The error term εit 
will be allowed to have a variance term that is specific to the municipality, i.e. the 
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Estimating this type of model can be done through the use of GLS estimation. As the 
parameters of the error terms structure are unknown, it will be necessary to use FGLS. 
Three sets of estimations will be presented. A benchmark model will exclude the 
distortion measures defined previously but will include a “level” variable indicating 
the per capita tax base before transfers (TBBT). The second set of models will include 
both the level variable in the form of per capita tax base before transfers and one of 
the two distortion measures. Finally, a set of models will exclude the level variable 
but include one of the two distortion variables. Table 1 summarizes the findings from 
such estimations. 
 
The parameter estimates in table 1 are in general remarkably significant. This is so for 
both the measures of distortions and the measures of tasks pursued by Danish 
municipalities. Comparing the estimation results in table 1 with the estimation results 
in table A2 indicates that the significance of the parameters of the covariates depends 
on the stochastic specification of the unobservable heterogeneity. More covariates 
have insignificant parameter estimates in the fixed effects model (table A2) than in 
the model with autocorrelation and heterogeneity in the variance-covariance structure 
(table 1). The later model specification will be preferred here, as the possibility of a 
collinear relationship between the unobservable individual effects in the fixed effects 
model with the observable covariates may be the cause of the insignificant parameter 
estimates in table A2. 
 
                                                 
26 The properties of εit are in general E(εit)=0, E(εit
2)=σi
2 and E(εitεjs)=0   20
Table 1: Models with first-order panel specific autocorrelation and heterogeneity 
















































































































































































































Observations/#  of  id  1512/237  1512/237 1512/237 1512/237 1512/237 
Notes: The t-statistics can be found in the parenthesis. Significant estimates are indicated with an * for 
5 percent levels and ** for 10 percent levels. The reduction in the number of panels in the panel data 
estimations from 275 to 237 has two origins. The data is not balanced, as there are not observations for 
the variables CLASSIZE, LIBLEND and CAPELD for all municipalities and for all years. In eight 
instances, this furthermore results in to few observations to estimate an autoregressive model. 
 
Focusing on the parameter estimates in table 1, the redistribution within the Danish 
system of intergovernmental transfers becomes clear. A marginal increase of the 
before transfer tax base by one Danish krone will others being equal only lead to an 
increase of the after transfer tax base of little under 0.4 Danish kroner. The sizeable 
redistribution within the transfers system should lead to incentive problems. This is   21
very much so. Being located at a point in the transfer scheme where one of the two 
incentive measures takes a high value leads to a higher return from a marginal 
increase in the before transfer tax base in terms of the after transfer tax base. 
Controlling for other factors of relevance to the transfer scheme, i.e. unobservable 
heterogeneity and the observable structure within the municipalities, it remains a 
result that incentive structures within the transfer scheme is of importance. Being 
located at a steep part of the transfer scheme will make it more attractive to perform 
well in terms of increasing the before transfer tax base. Furthermore, being located at 
a point of the transfer scheme with a large positive divergence between the actual 
outcome of the transfer scheme and the linear outcome will also contribute to the 
incentive to perform well. The reverse is the case in the case of large negative 
divergences from the linear outcome. It may be noted, that the effect of the incentive 
measures are stabile with regards to the exclusion of the before transfer tax base in the 
estimation model. These results support the idea that the exact shaping of the transfer 
schemes will be of importance to the economic performance of local geo-
administrative entities in Denmark. It is of vital importance for the economic 
performance, how transfer schemes are planned and implemented. Municipalities 
located on the flat parts of the transfer scheme should be expected to be less eager to 
build the economic base through e.g. service packages to firms located or to be 
located in the municipality or a high productivity offering high public service levels at 
moderate tax costs, both of which may build and increase the per capita tax base of 
the municipality. 
 
Another result can be taken from the parameter estimates in table 1. Most of the 
included covariates in the analysis attempt to measure some real expenditure 
requirements, i.e. they are not the actual expenditure on a given activity pursued by 
the municipality but a measure for the eligibility to receive services from Danish 
municipalities. Given this nature of the covariates, the signs of the parameter 
estimates do surprise in a consistent manner. Controlling for the size of the before 
transfer tax base, the incentive structure and the other covariates, an increase in the 
share of children of age 0 to 6 years does not materialize into an actual increase in the 
after transfer tax base. Similar results are obtained for a number of other covariates. 
This indicates that the aggregate outcome of the transfer scheme deviates 
considerably from the policy aim of redistribution from municipalities with a low   22
demand pressure to municipalities with a high demand pressure. Mixing different 
objectives such as compensation for demographic structures and differences in the 
gross (before transfer) per capita tax base will therefore most likely result in a second 
best outcome. The transfer scheme may not only lead to distortions from the 
embedded incentive problems, but it may furthermore miss its policy aims of 
compensating for the demographic differences across different regions and 
municipalities. Designing transfer schemes will therefore be an important tool in both 
providing growth potentials and in making adequate compensations for the difference 
in demographic structures. 
 
5. Discussion 
Theory predicts the presence of incentive problems embedded in inter-governmental 
transfer schemes. Sharing tax bases across different tax jurisdictions will lead to 
incentive problems in much the same way that income taxes will on labour. The 
results in this paper on the Danish system of inter-governmental transfers confirm 
these problems. Transfer schemes will in themselves create incentive problems. 
Furthermore, mixing different policy aims into the same system of transfers will 
endanger the coherence between goals and outcomes. These results point to transfer 
schemes that obey the “one goal – one instrument” rule. This in sense follows the idea 
of Boadway and Keen and Boadway and Flatters. Deviating from such design 
principles may question the whole purpose of the transfer scheme. The transfer 
scheme may not reach its overall policy aim because endogenous mechanisms may 
exist connecting the different policy aims of the schemes that bring the outcome 
further away from the overall policy aim. This may be reflected in the result from the 
Danish intergovernmental transfer scheme. It may be a goal to compensate for the 
differences in demographic characteristics, but this may contribute to the distortions 
in an intergovernmental transfer schemes that redistribute moneys from wealthy to 
poor municipalities. 
 
So what is the design of an “optimal” transfer scheme? This clearly depends on the 
extent of national policies upon which the intergovernmental transfer scheme is based. 
Pronounced national policies within the field of regional inequality will lead to a 
different outcome, relative to the situation with less pronounced policies. Delegation 
will imply a dependence on the local or regional potential for economic and social   23
development, while facilitating the gains from decentralization according to the ideas 
of Oates. In a strongly stylized argument, delegation to lower levels of the geo-
administrative structure should therefore only be pursued in a scenario where the 
national policies accept regional inequality or the efficiency losses from 
intergovernmental transfer schemes. It may in that respect be noted, that in the later 
scenario, reaching the policy aim of reducing regional inequality will depend on the 
design of the transfer scheme. The result from the Danish transfer scheme points to 
potential pitfalls in reaching such aims. It may be the target of transfer schemes to 
reduce regional inequality, but if designed wrongly the systems may work against its 
targets. Incentive problems may lead municipalities at different stages of the 
economic and social development to emphasize the importance of promoting 
economic growth differently. 
 
Finally, the results of the paper calls for a continual process of adapting transfer 
schemes to the policy aims at the national and local level. Given the relative 
importance attached by national and local policies to regional inequality, the exact 
design of the transfer scheme should continually be adjusted. This is the case in 
Denmark, where the present intergovernmental transfer scheme has come under an 
increasing political pressure. It seems that both national and local policies have 
shifted in respect to the weighting of policy objectives. The design of the future 
transfer scheme should therefore be interesting to observe. It remains an issue that 
equity comes at a cost when dealing with municipalities as economic agents. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: The seven main tasks of Danish Municipalities 
The tasks/demographics  The measures 
Demographics  Share of 0 to 6 years old in the population (SH0-6), 
Share of 7 to 16 years old in the population (SH7-16), 
Share of 66+ years in the population (SH66+) 
Labour  markets  Share of 25 to 64 years old without vocational 
education (SHNOVOC), Share of 25 to 64 years old 
with higher education (SHHEDU), Share of 17 to 66 
years old that are full time unemployed (SHUNEMP), 
Share of 17 to 66 years old in active labour market 
schemes (SHACLAB) 
Housing  Number of housing allowance receivers per 100 
households (HOUSALLOW) 
Schooling  Average class size (CLASSIZE), library use in the 
form of lending’s per capita (LIBLEND) 
Child care  Child care capacity per 0 to 2 years old (CAP0-2), 
Child care capacity per 3 to 5 years old (CAP3-5), 
Child care capacity per 6 to 9 years old (CAP6-9) 
Care for the elderly  Capacity at homes for the elderly per 100 of age 67 
years or more (CAPELD) 
Integration of immigrants  Asylum applications per 10.000 residents (ASYLUM) 
Social  Assistance  Number of persons receiving early retirement 
allowances (førtidspension) per 100 persons of age 17 
to 66 years old (FOERTID), Number of persons 
receiving social assistance (kontanthjælp) per 100 
persons of age 17 to 66 years old (KONTHJ) 
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Table A2: Fixed effects  models with iid errors 
















































































































































































































Observations/# of id  1520/245  1520/245  1520/245  1520/245  1520/245 
R-squared 0.76  0.76  0.88  0.73  0.81 
Breusch-Pagan test (σµi
2=0)  934.3** 909.9**  31.86**  2087.8**  1724.0** 
Hausman  204.4**  337.5** 589.1** 797.6** 539.7** 
Notes: The t-statistics can be found in the parenthesis. Significant estimates are indicated with an * for 
5 percent levels and ** for 10 percent levels. The panel is unbalanced. The reduction in the number of 
panels in the panel data from 275 to 245 is caused by the absence of observations for the variables 
CLASSIZE, LIBLEND and CAPELD for some municipalities and for some years. 
 